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a b s t r a c t
In this paper the problem of the number of fixed points for an RSA algorithm is considered.
This is an important question from the point of view of any cryptosystem. We have
estimated the expected value of this number for randomly chosen RSA parameters. It
turned out that it is O(ln2 n), and the probability of finding such a point is O(ln2 n/n). Thus,
these values are really negligible, which had been intuitively expected.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The RSA algorithm plays a significant role in public key infrastructure. Thus, it is very important to analyze properties of
this cryptosystem, depending on the choice of its parameters [2,8,9,1,4,7], especially those related to its security. The above
cited papers represent the number of fixed points in the form of algebraic expressions. However, these formulas do not give
information about the number of such points for randomly chosen parameters (i.e. in the average case). This problem is
studied in our paper. Our analysis shows that for practical values of the parameters the expected number of fixed points for
RSA encryption is really negligible.
To present the result, the standard notation will be used. We assume that the RSA modulus n is a product of two primes
p and q of the same bit length. This means that n = pq and blog2(p) + 1c = blog2(q) + 1c. We denote a private exponent
by d and the corresponding public exponent by e. These exponents are, in fact, private and public keys for RSA operation.
Definition 1. We say that x ∈ Zn is a fixed point of RSA encryption if
xe ≡ x mod n.
This means that element x ∈ Zn is a fixed point of RSA iff it is a root of the polynomial S(X) = X e− X ∈ Zn[X]. Since n = pq
and p and q are prime then Zn ' Zp × Zq and every root r of S ∈ Zn[X] can be represented as a pair (r1, r2) ∈ Zp × Zq. By
the Chinese Remainder Theorem [5] we have
S(r) ≡ 0 mod n iff
{
S(r1) ≡ 0 mod p,
S(r2) ≡ 0 mod q.
The following lemma and its proof can be found in [2].
∗ Tel.: +48 22 8261281.
E-mail address: achmielo@ippt.gov.pl.
0304-3975/$ – see front matter© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2009.09.030
A. Chmielowiec / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 288–292 289
Lemma 1. S(X) = X e − X = X(X e−1 − 1) ∈ Zp[X] has exactly 1+ GCD(e− 1, p− 1) solutions. 
Clearly, we have that S(X) ∈ Zq[X] has exactly 1 + GCD(e − 1, q − 1) solutions. Thus, the total number of RSA fixed
points is equal to
(1+ GCD(e− 1, p− 1))(1+ GCD(e− 1, q− 1)).
In the following sections wewill find the expected value of the number of fixed points for randomly chosen RSA parameters
p, q and e.
2. The GCD of random integers
LetM be a positive integer and U = {1, 2, . . . ,M}. First we briefly recall the standard result of Dirichlet [3] concerning
the probability that GCD(u, v) = 1 for randomly chosen (u, v) ∈ U×U . We present only those elements of the proof which
are essential in our further considerations. Let us start from the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2. For any integer M > 1 we have the following relations:
M∑
k=1
1
k
≤ lnM + 1, (1)
1
M
≤
∞∑
k=M
1
k2
≤ 1
M − 1 . (2)
Proof. For every positive decreasing function f (x)we have
∫ k+1
k f (x)dx ≤ f (k) ≤
∫ k
k−1 f (x)dx. Applying this relation to the
function f (x) = 1x we have
M∑
k=1
1
k
= 1+
M∑
k=2
1
k
≤ 1+
M∑
k=2
(∫ k
k−1
dx
x
)
= 1+
∫ M
1
dx
x
= ln M + 1.
Next, using the function 1
x2
we can prove the second part of this lemma. Since 1
x2
is decreasing for positive numbers then for
the upper bound we have
∞∑
k=B+1
1
k2
≤
∞∑
k=B+1
(∫ k
k−1
dx
x2
)
=
∫ ∞
B
dx
x2
= 1
B
.
For the lower bound we have the similar inequality
∞∑
k=B+1
1
k2
≥
∞∑
k=B+1
(∫ k+1
k
dx
x2
)
=
∫ ∞
B+1
dx
x2
= 1
B+ 1 . 
In general, Dirichlet’s theorem gives the probability that randomly chosen integers are coprime.
Theorem 1 (G. Lejeune Dirichlet). Let P(U) denote the probability that GCD(u, v) = 1 for randomly chosen pairs (u, v) ∈ U×U.
Then we have the following relation:
P1 = lim|U|→∞ P(U) =
6
pi2
.
Proof. The original proof of this theorem can be found in [3]. To sketch the proof we will use an equivalent result given by
Mertens [6]:
M∑
k=1
ϕ(k) = 3
pi2
M2 +∆,
where ϕ is the Euler function,
∆ <
(
1
2
lnM + 1
2
γ + 5
8
)
M + 1
and γ is the Euler constant. Let q(M) denote the number of pairs (u, v) ∈ U × U for which GCD(u, v) = 1. We split the set
of all pairs into three parts and next count the number of coprime numbers separately:
1. for u < v the number of coprime integers is equal to
∑M
v=1 ϕ(v)− 1,
2. for u = v the number of coprime integers is equal to 1,
3. for u > v the number of coprime integers is equal to
∑M
u=1 ϕ(u)− 1.
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This leads to the following result:
q(M) = 2
(
M∑
v=1
ϕ(v)− 1
)
+ 1 = 6
pi2
M2 + 2∆− 1.
Thus
P1 = lim
M→∞
q(M)
M2
= 6
pi2
,
and forM > 1 we have
q(M)
M2
= P1 + εM , (3)
where
εM = 2∆− 1M2 <
(
lnM + γ + 54
)
M + 1
M2
< 4
lnM
M
.  (4)
The above theorem allows us to get a more general result, which describes the probability PB that the greatest common
divisor of two integers is no greater than a given integer B.
Proposition 1. Let U be defined as above. Then
PB = lim|U|→∞ P
({
(u, v) ∈ U2 : GCD(u, v) ≤ B}) = P1 · B∑
d=1
1
d2
.
Proof. We will use the following notation:
{GCD(u, v) ≤ B} ≡ {(u, v) ∈ U2 : GCD(u, v) ≤ B} ,
{GCD(u, v) = d} ≡ {(u, v) ∈ U2 : GCD(u, v) = d} .
One can see that
lim|U|→∞ P
({
GCD(u, v) ≤ B}) = lim|U|→∞ P
(
B⋃
d=1
{
GCD(u, v) = d}).
The events
{
GCD(u, v) = d} are disjoint, so we have
lim|U|→∞ P
({
GCD(u, v) ≤ B}) = lim|U|→∞ B∑
d=1
P
({
GCD(u, v) = d})
=
B∑
d=1
lim|U|→∞ P
({
GCD(u, v) = d}).
The probability P
({
GCD(u, v) = d}) can be easily computed because GCD(u, v) = d iff d | u, d | v and GCD(u/d, v/d) = 1.
This leads to the conclusion that
lim|U|→∞ P
({
GCD(u, v) = d}) = P1
d2
what completes the proof. 
This proposition gives us the value of the probability PB that the GCD of random integers is at most B. This result can be
assembled into a very nice formula for large B.
Proposition 2. If U is defined as above then
1− P1
B
≤ PB ≤ 1− P1B+ 1 ,
where P1 was defined in Theorem 1 (Dirichlet).
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Proof. On the basis of inequality (2) we have
P1
B
≥ P1 ·
∞∑
k=B+1
1
k2
≥ P1
B+ 1 ,
1− P1
B
≤ 1− P1 ·
∞∑
k=B+1
1
k2
≤ 1− P1
B+ 1 ,
1− P1
B
≤ P1 ·
B∑
k=1
1
k2
≤ 1− P1
B+ 1 ,
1− P1
B
≤ PB ≤ 1− P1B+ 1 . 
3. Probability of fixed point selection
Now, we evaluate the expected value of the number of fixed points for a randomly chosen key e and randomly chosen
parameters p, q such that blog2(p)+ 1c = blog2(q)+ 1c.
Theorem 2. Let the RSA modulus n = pq, where p, q are primes, and let e be a randomly chosen public key such that
GCD(e, (p− 1)(q− 1)) = 1. The expected value of the number of RSA fixed points satisfies the following relation:
ES ≤
(
3(P1 + ε√n)(2+ ln n)
2
)2
= O(ln2 n).
Proof. Let us introduce the notation
Bp = GCD
(
e− 1
2
,
p− 1
2
)
, Bq = GCD
(
e− 1
2
,
q− 1
2
)
.
Using relations (3) and (4) we can estimate the expected value of the number of RSA fixed points as follows:
ES ≤
∑
Bp,Bq<
√
n
(2Bp + 1)P1 + ε
√
n
B2p
(2Bq + 1)P1 + ε
√
n
B2q
= (P1 + ε√n)2
∑
Bp,Bq<
√
n
4BpBq + 2Bp + 2Bq + 1
B2pB2q
≤ (P1 + ε√n)2
∑
Bp,Bq<
√
n
9BpBq
B2pB2q
= 9(P1 + ε√n)2
∑
Bp,Bq<
√
n
1
BpBq
= 9(P1 + ε√n)2
 ∑
Bp<
√
n
1
Bp
 ∑
Bq<
√
n
1
Bq
 .
By the inequality (1) and (4) we have
ES ≤ 9(P1 + ε√n)2(1+ ln(
√
n))2
=
(
3(P1 + ε√n)(2+ ln n)
2
)2
= O(ln2 n). 
Corollary 1. Under the above assumptions the probability P of finding a fixed point is bounded by
P ≤
(
3(P1 + ε√n)(2+ ln n)
2
√
n
)2
= O
(
ln2 n
n
)
.
4. Summary
The above estimations show that for practical values of RSA parameters, i.e. for n at least 1024 bits long, the expected
value for the fixed points is less than 4.2× 105 and the probability of finding such a point is about 4.2× 10−97. This means
that in practical applications the RSA cryptosystem is secure from this point of view.
292 A. Chmielowiec / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 288–292
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank Professor Janusz Szczepanski for valuable discussion.
References
[1] W.D. Banks, I.E. Shparlinski, On the number of sparse RSA exponents, Journal of Number Theory 95 (2002) 340–350.
[2] G.R. Blakley, I. Borosh, Rivest–Shamir–Adlemanpublic key cryptosystemsdonot always concealmessages, Computers &MathematicswithApplications
5 (1979) 169–178.
[3] G. Lejeune Dirichlet, Abhandlungen Königlich Preuß. Akad. Wiss. (1849) 69–83.
[4] L.H. Encinas, J.M. Masque, A.Q. Dios, Large decryption exponents in RSA, Applied Mathematics Letters 16 (2003) 293–295.
[5] K. Ireland, M. Rosen, A Classical Introduction to Modern Number Theory, Springer, 1990.
[6] F. Mertens, Ueber einige asymptotische Gesetze der Zahlentheorie, Journal für die Reine und Angewandte Mathematik 77 (1874) 289–291.
[7] I.E. Shparlinski, On the uniformity of distribution of the decryption exponent in fixed encryption exponent RSA, Information Processing Letters 92
(2004) 143–147.
[8] D.R. Smith, J.T. Palmer, Universal fixed messages and the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman cryptosystem, Mathematika 26 (1979) 44–52.
[9] E.R. Verhuel, H.C.A. van Tilborg, Cryptanalysis of ‘less short’ RSA secret exponents, Applicable Algebra in Engineering Communication and Computing
8 (1997) 425–435.
